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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (h) and the order of the Utah 
Supreme Court transferring this case to the Court of Appeals. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the final judgment in a civil 
case for the collection of money under a written contract. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was a prior judge's denial of Appellant's motion for 
summary judgment on the issue of accord and satisfaction 
binding on the trial judge as the law of the case? 
2. Did the trial court err in failing to make adequate 
findings of fact to support the conclusion of law denying 
Appellant's affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction? 
3. If there were adequate findings to support the 
conclusion of law denying Appellant's affirmative defense of 
accord and satisfaction, were the findings clearly contrary 
to the weight of the evidence? 
4. Did the trial court misapply the law to the 
established facts relating to Appellant's affirmative defense 
of accord and satisfaction? 
5. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in 
denying Appellant's affirmative defense of accord and 
satisfaction? 
6. Did the court err in allowing prejudgment interest 
to be compounded? 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC. 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
This is a civil action for collection of money for 
services rendered under a written contract. 
2. Course of the Proceedings 
The complaint was filed August 8, 1985 praying for 
damages of $30,162.50 (R. 2). An Answer and Counterclaim1 
was filed September 3, 1985 (R. 10). Plaintiff filed an 
Amended Complaint May 16, 1986 praying for damages of 
$21,549.50 (R. 24), to which an answer was filed June 2, 1986 
(R. 31) . Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on 
July 31, 1986 (R. 45), which the Court (Judge Michael Murphy 
presiding) denied in a Summary Decision and Order filed 
December 29, 1986 (R. 127). The case was tried to the Court 
(Judge Timothy Hanson presiding) on January 12 and 13, 1988. 
3. Disposition in the Trial Court 
On April 1, 1988, the trial court entered judgment for 
Plaintiff/Respondent for $10,990.00, plus prejudgment 
interest thereon, compounded annually from April 15, 1985 to 
the date of judgment (R. 275), based on Findings of Fact and 
1
 The Counterclaim was settled and dismissed by 
stipulation. 
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Conclusions of Law (R. 270) entered concurrently with the 
Judgment. 
4. Statement of Relevant Facts 
In January, 1985, Plaintiff/Respondent Estate Landscape 
and Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. (hereinafter "Estate") and 
Defendant/Appellant The Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph 
Company (hereinafter "Mountain Bell") entered into a written 
agreement wherein Estate agreed to perform certain snow 
removal services for Mountain Bell.2 As part of this 
contract, Estate was obligated to remove snow at Mountain 
Bell's central office in Alta, Utah "when the snow reaches 
four inches."3 The contract provided: "The cost is to be 
$85.00 per removal or $55.00 for the front end loader and 
operator as required."4 The contract also required Estate to 
submit monthly billings.5 
Between December 28, 1984 and April 1, 1985, Estate 
performed snow removal services at Mountain Bell's Alta 
office, but did not submit monthly billings as required by 
the contract.6 At the close of the snow season, Estate sent 
2
 Exhibit 3, attached hereto as Appendix D. 
3
 Exhibit 3 (see Appendix D). 
4
 Exhibit 3 (see Appendix D). 
5
 Exhibit 3 (see Appendix D, at Art. V). 
6
 Transcript of Jan. 12 at 50-53; Smith Transcript of 
Jan. 13 at 10; Response to Defendant's First Set of Requests 
for Admission #3, R. 104. Because there were several 
reporters at various times during the trial, the transcript 
is not paginated consecutively. Therefore, it will be 
referred to in this brief by date, and where necessary, by 
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Mountain Bell an itemized final bill for $30,162.50, 
representing services rendered at the Alta site during that 
period.7 The billing included charges for the use of dump 
trucks, although the contract contained no provision for 
payment for such equipment.8 
Mountain Bell's contract administrator was shocked at 
the size of the bill, and therefore made inquiry to determine 
whether the amount of snowfall at Alta warranted the charges 
set forth on the bill.9 Relying upon daily snowfall data 
supplied by the Alta Peruvian Lodge, Mountain Bell decided to 
dispute the bill as being grossly excessive.10 
As a means of resolving the billing dispute, Mountain 
Bell decided not to pay the charges for days on which less 
than four inches of snowfall was measured by the Alta 
Peruvian Lodge, but only the balance of $8,613.00.l:L After 
consultation with legal counsel, Mountain Bell's contract 
administrator therefore prepared a letter to Estate, dated 
June 14, 1985,12 identifying those days on which the snowfall 
the name of the reporter. 
7
 Exhibit 4, attached hereto as Appendix E. 
8
 Transcript of Jan. 12 at 49-50. 
9
 Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 37-39. 
1 0
 Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 38-41. 
1 1
 Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 37-43. 
12
 Exhibit 6, attached hereto as Appendix F. 
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at Alta was less than four inches, together with the charges 
billed for those days.13 The letter concluded: 
Based on the above identified billing descrepencies 
[sic] we have enclosed a check for $8613.00 which 
is payment in full for satisfaction of contracted 
services. If you are not willing to accept that 
sum, $8613.00 in full satisfaction of sums due, DO 
NOT negotiate the check, for upon your negotiation 
of that check, we will treat the matter as fully 
paid. 
(emphasis in original) 
Mountain Bell's bill payment supervisor held the letter 
pending delivery of a check for $8,613.00 from Mountain 
Bell's accounting department for enclosure with the letter.14 
However, on or about June 21, 1985, rather than delivering 
the check to the person holding the letter, Mountain Bell's 
accounting department mailed the check directly to Estate.15 
Upon discovering that the check had been sent 
separately, Mountain Bell's bill payment supervisor sent the 
letter without enclosing a check, on about June 28, 1985.16 
On about July 23, 1985, Estate's attorney wrote Mountain Bell 
a letter acknowledging receipt of the check and demanding 
payment of the balance.17 At the time Estate received the 
13
 Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 42-44. 
14
 Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 45. 
1 5
 Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 44-46. 
16 Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 45; Smith Transcript 
of Jan. 13 at 5. 
17
 Exhibit 14; Transcript of Jan. 12 at 8-9. 
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letter (August 5, 1985)/18 it had not negotiated the check.19 
Estate knew that the check that it had received earlier from 
Mountain Bell was the check referred to in the letter.20 
Estate retained the $8,613.00 check until on or about October 
28, 1985
 f when it was negotiated and deposited for 
collection.21 
At trial, the court received undisputed evidence of the 
foregoing facts, in addition to receiving conflicting 
evidence concerning whether Estate had breached its contract 
with Mountain Bell. The court found that Estate had breached 
the contract by failing to issue monthly billings to Mountain 
Bell as required under the contract, but held the breach to 
be immaterial.22 The court determined, however, that Estate 
18
 Transcript of Jan. 12 at 11-12. The letter was sent 
by certified mail, which explains the delay between sending 
(June 28, 1985) and receipt (Aug. 5, 1985). (R. 100) 
19
 Exhibit 8, attached hereto as Appendix G; Response to 
Defendant's Second Set of Requests for Admissions #7, R. at 101. 
2 0
 Response to Defendant's Second Set of Requests for 
Admissions #8, R. at 101; Tripp Transcript of Jan. 13 at 24-
25. Smith Transcript of Jan. 13 at 12. 
2 1
 Exhibit 8 (see Appendix G) ; Response to Defendant's 
Second Set of Requests for Admissions #9, R. at 101. Three 
days after it received the letter on Aug. 5, 1985, Estate 
filed its complaint, praying for damages in the full amount 
of the final bill, $30,162.50. (R. 2) Furthermore, Estate's 
own accounting ledger never showed application of the 
$8,613.00 check against the account. Exhibit 5; Transcript 
of Jan. 12 at 41; Smith Transcript of Jan. 13 at 11-12. It 
was only after the check was negotiated that Estate sought to 
amend its complaint to recover the lesser amount of 
$21,549.50 ($30,162.50 less $8,613.00). (R. 24-27) 
2 2
 Transcript of Jan. 15 at 6-7. 
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was not entitled to bill for the use of dump trucks, because 
the contract did not mention them.23 
The court found that the contract provision regarding 
payment of $85.00 per removal "when the snow reaches 4 
inches" was ambiguous, and construed the contract against 
Mountain Bell, thus allowing Estate to recover for multiple 
removals on a single day.24 The court also held that the 
criterion for payment for a removal was not limited to inches 
of snowfall, but also included snow accumulation from 
drifting.25 Finally, the court determined that removal of 
each increment of four inches of snow constituted a "removal" 
(e.g. removal of eight inches constituted two "removals").26 
In denying Mountain Bell's affirmative defense of accord 
and satisfaction, Judge Hanson (the trial judge) relied 
heavily on Judge Murphy's Summary Decision denying Mountain 
Bell's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, stating that he 
considered that ruling to be the law of the case.27 No 
finding of fact was made to support the denial of the accord 
and satisfaction defense. (R. 270) 
Based on the foregoing, the court determined that 
Mountain Bell was liable under the contract for all amounts 
23
 Transcript of Jan. 15 at 12-14. 
2 4
 Transcript of Jan. 15 at 9-10. 
2 5
 Transcript of Jan. 15 at 11, 16. 
2 6
 Transcript of Jan. 15 at 16. 
2 7
 Transcript of Jan. 15 at 3-4. 
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billed except the charges for use of dump trucks. (R. 270) 
Accordingly, it entered judgment for $10,990.00, representing 
the original billed amount of $30,162.50 less the charges for 
use of dump trucks and less the $8,613.00 check already 
received from Mountain Bell. (R. 275-76) The court further 
awarded prejudgment interest, compounded annually from April 
15, 1985 to the date of judgment. (R. 276) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court erred by failing to make any 
findings of fact on Mountain Bell's affirmative d€>fense of 
accord and satisfaction. Thus the conclusion of law 
rejecting that defense is unsupported and must be reversed. 
Even if findings had been made, however, the weight of the 
evidence is clearly contrary to a conclusion that there was 
no accord and satisfaction, because the uncontroverted 
evidence and admissions on that issue establish the defense 
as a matter of law. 
2. The trial judge erred by relying on a prior judge's 
denial of Mountain Bell's motion for summary judgment on the 
accord and satisfaction issue as being the law of the case. 
The denial of that motion did not become the law of the case, 
and the trial judge's reliance on it prejudiced Mountain Bell 
because the standard for granting summary judgment is biased 
against the movant, while no such bias should exist in a 
trial setting. Thus Mountain Bell was deprived of a fair 
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opportunity to have its defense considered by the trial 
judge. 
3. Mountain Bell is entitled to dismissal as a matter 
of law on the basis of its defense of accord and 
satisfaction. Undisputed facts establish that a bona fide 
dispute existed between the parties over the unliquidated 
amount owing on the contract, that Mountain Bell tendered a 
check in a lesser amount to settle the entire dispute, that a 
condition was attached to the tender, to the effect that 
negotiation of the check would fully satisfy the claim, and 
that Estate negotiated the check after receiving notice of 
the condition. The facts that the condition was stated in a 
letter sent separately from and later than the check, and 
that Estate demanded payment of the remainder claimed to be 
due and filed suit before negotiating the check, do not 
defeat the accord and satisfaction, because the accord and 
satisfaction takes place at the time of negotiation of the 
check, not before. By negotiating the check, Estate accepted 
the condition attached thereto. 
4. The court erred in allowing pre-judgment interest to 
be compounded, because compounding is not authorized by 
statute and is contrary to case law. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE CORRECT STANDARDS OF REVIEW REQUIRE THE COURT OF 
APPEALS TO GIVE NO DEFERENCE TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
TO REVERSE IF CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY 
FINDINGS OF FACT, IF THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IS 
CLEARLY CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS, OR IF THE TRIAL COURT 
MISAPPLIED THE LAW TO ESTABLISHED FACTS. 
Under well established principles of appellate review, 
the findings of the trial court on disputed issues of fact 
would be sustained if they were supported by substantial 
evidence• However, in this case, with respect to the issue 
of accord and satisfaction arising from the negotiation of 
Mountain Bell's check offered "in full satisfaction of 
contracted services," the court made no findings of fact, but 
simply entered the following conclusion of law: 
1. Based on the Court's Finding of Facts, it is 
hereby concluded that there was no accord and 
satisfaction in that the Order of Judge Michael R. 
Murphy delineated the area fully and is the law of 
the case. Even if it were not the law of the case, 
Exhibit 6 [the letter of June 14, 1985 from 
Mountain Bell to Estate] did not fulfill the 
requirements of an accord and satisfaction. 
In contrast to findings of fact, "[conclusions of law 
. . . are simply reviewed on appeal for correctness without 
any deference to the trial court." Cove View Excavating & 
Construction Co. v. Flynn, 88 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 7 (Utah App. 
1988); see also. Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co.. 711 P.2d 
250, 253 (Utah 1985); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 
1070 (Utah 1985). Mountain Bell has long maintained that it 
is entitled to a judgment of dismissal as a matter of law on 
the undisputed facts relating to the accord and satisfaction 
defense. Thus, this court may determine whether Mountain 
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Bell is entitled to such a dismissal without deferring to the 
trial court's contrary view. 
Under Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "In all 
actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . . the court 
shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon . . . . Requests for findings are 
not necessary for purposes of review." The requirement for 
findings "is mandatory and may not be waived. . . . Failure 
of the trial court to make findings on all material issues is 
reversible error." Romrell v. Zion's First National Bank, 
611 P.2d 392, 394-95 (Utah 1980). See also Gaddis Investment 
Company v. Morrison, 3 Utah 2d 43, 278 P.2d 284 (1954).28 
Not only must the court make findings on the ultimate issue, 
but it should also make findings on subsidiary issues of 
fact: 
The importance of complete, accurate and consistent 
findings of fact in a case tried by a judge is 
essential to the resolution of dispute under the 
proper rule of law. To that end the findings 
should be sufficiently detailed and include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached. [citations omitted] The rule as stated 
in Prows v. Hawley, 72 Utah 444, 271 p. 31, 33 
(1928) is: 
that until the court has found on all the 
material issues raised by the pleadings, 
28Rule 52(a) also provides: "It will be sufficient if 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally 
and recorded in open court following the close of the 
evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision 
filed by the court." However, in his oral ruling at the 
close of the trial, the trial judge did not state any factual 
findings on the accord and satisfaction issue. Transcript of 
Jan. 15 at 2-4. 
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the findings are insufficient to support 
a judgment; and that findings should be 
sufficiently distinct and certain as not 
to require an investigation or review to 
determine what issues are decided, 
Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338-39 (Utah 1979). Thus 
the failure of the trial court to make findings on the accord 
and satisfaction issue requires reversal. The lack of such 
findings on the accord and satisfaction issue deprives this 
Court of a basis for proper review of the conclusion denying 
that defense. It is especially important to have findings on 
the facts relating to that defense, because all of the 
elements of the defense were apparently established by 
undisputed evidence and by Estate's admissions. [See infra, 
pp. 17-30] It is impossible to challenge non-findings as 
being clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence; hence 
Mountain Bell is obviously prejudiced by the lack of findings 
on that issue. 
If this Court concludes that findings on the accord and 
satisfaction issue are unnecessary, or that there are 
sufficient findings in the record, or if this Court assumes 
that if findings had been made on all factual issues relating 
to the accord and satisfaction defense, they would have 
supported the conclusion of law, then the appropriate 
standard of review is whether the weight of the evidence is 
clearly contrary to the findings, or whether it manifestly 
appears that the trial court misapplied the law to the 
established facts, or whether the reviewing court reaches a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. 
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See Elton v. Utah State Retirement Board. 28 Utah 2d 368, 503 
P.2d 137 (1972); Cove View Excavating & Construction Co. v. 
Flyrm, 88 Utah Adv. Rep. 6,7 (Utah App. 1988). With respect 
to sufficiency of the evidence, the Utah Supreme Court stated 
in Ranch Homes, Inc. v. Greater Park City Corp.. 592 P.2d 
620, 626 (Utah 1979): "[W]hen a finding is so plainly 
unreasonable that no trier of the fact could fairly make such 
a finding, it cannot be said to be supported by substantial 
evidence and the finding will be rejected as a matter of law, 
and the fact determined otherwise." 
II. THE DENIAL OF MOUNTAIN BELL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IS NOT BINDING ON THE TRIAL COURT, NOR DOES IT 
PREVENT THE TRIAL JUDGE FROM EXERCISING INDEPENDENT 
JUDGMENT IN DECIDING WHETHER MOUNTAIN BELL WAS ENTITLED 
TO THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION; 
THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
DENIAL OF THE MOTION WAS THE LAW OF THE CASE. 
The "law of the case" doctrine does not bind a trial 
judge to follow the decision of an earlier judge of the same 
district in denying a motion for summary judgment. The Utah 
Supreme Court has stated that "[w]hen a party thinks that his 
case is so clear that he should have a summary judgment 
without trial and so moves, the denial of that motion settles 
that issue and nothing else. That is, that he is not entitled 
to the summary judgment." West v. West. 15 Utah 2d 87, 387 
P.2d 686, 689 (1963) (emphasis added). 
While an earlier decision of law in a case is typically 
followed to avoid piecemeal litigation of an identical 
question, the denial of a motion for summary judgment 
-13-
presents an entirely different situation, because it does 
nothing more than negatively answer the question of whether a 
genuine issue of material fact exists. The Utah Supreme 
Court recognized such a distinction in Richardson v. Grand 
Central Corp.. 572 P.2d 395 (Utah 1977), where it stated: 
The purpose of the doctrine of 'the law of the case7 is 
that in the interest of economy of time and efficiency 
of procedure, it is desirable to avoid the delays and 
the difficulties involved in repetitious contentions and 
rulings upon the same proposition in the same case. But 
it is also true that generally preliminary or interim 
rulings do not rise to the dignity of res judicata or 
stare decisis. It is further true that ordinarily one 
judge* of the same court cannot properly overrule the 
decision of another judge of that court. Notwithstanding 
thos€* propositions, the ruling of one judge cis to the 
sufficiency or effect of pleadings, does not prevent 
another division of the court from considering the same 
question of law if it is properly involved on a 
subs€jquent motion which presents the case in a different 
1ight. Similarly, the denial of a motion for summary 
judgment is not binding upon another division of the 
court in different circumstances, such as where the 
evidence has been presented so a judgment can be formed 
with respect thereto. 
Id. at 397 (emphasis added). In Richardson, one judge had 
denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, while a 
subsequent judge granted the defendant's motion for a 
directed verdict at trial; the Utah Supreme Court affirmed 
the judgment. See also Hammer v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 29 Utah 
2d 415, 510 P.2d 1104, 1105 (1973). The exhibits and 
testimony of witnesses introduced at the trial in this case 
presented the issue of accord and satisfaction in "different 
circumstances" and was not the type of "repetitious 
contention" that the law of the case doctrine was designed to 
prevent. Whether Mountain Bell was entitled to the 
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affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction in this 
contract dispute was a question upon which the trial judge 
had an obligation to rule independently, based on the trial 
evidence and admissions on file. His deference to the 
earlier judge's denial of summary judgment becomes even more 
objectionable when the cursory treatment of Mountain Bell's 
defense at the close of the trial is examined. Judge Hanson 
did not articulate any reasons for rejecting the accord and 
satisfaction defense other than to refer to Judge Murphy's 
ruling, which he considered "not merely just a motion for 
summary judgment denied," but a ruling that "carries more 
weight than merely a minute entry," concluding "I do believe 
it is the law of the case."29 
The trial judge failed to distinguish the different 
standards under which evidence must be judged on a motion for 
summary judgment as opposed to a trial. On a motion for 
summary judgment, a court "must evaluate all the evidence and 
all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." 
Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). In a 
non-jury trial, on the other hand, the judge, as trier of the 
facts, must weigh the evidence impartially. The trial 
judge's reliance on the earlier ruling on Mountain Bell's 
motion for summary judgment, where the law imposed a bias 
Transcript of Jan. 15 at 3. 
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against Mountain Bell (the movant), denied Mountain Bell an 
opportunity to have its defense weighed neutrally at trial. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING TO 
DISMISS ESTATE'S COMPLAINT ON THE BASIS OF MOUNTAIN 
BELL'S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 
Utah law requires three elements to be established for 
an accord and satisfaction defense: (1) an unliquidated claim 
or a bona fide dispute over the amount due; (2) a payment 
tendered in full settlement of the entire dispute; and (3) an 
acceptance, of the payment. See Marton Remodeling v. Jensen, 
706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985); Masonry Equipment & Supply v. 
Willco Associates, Inc.. 755 P.2d 756 (Utah App. 1988). 
While accord and satisfaction is simply an application of 
general contract law, which requires competent parties, 
offer, acceptance, and consideration to make the agreement 
enforceable, see Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 
730 (Utah 1985); Bench v. Bechtel Civil & Minerals, Inc., 87 
Utah Adv. Rep. 21,22 (Utah App. 1988); and Brimley v. Gasser, 
754 P.2d 97 (Utah App. 1988), the settlement of the dispute 
is deemed to be sufficient consideration where the amount in 
question is unliquidated. Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. 
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980). Where the offer 
is tendered in the form of a check for less than the amount 
claimed, with the condition that negotiation constitutes full 
settlement, the mere negotiation of the check constitutes 
acceptancer notwithstanding the payee's efforts or intent to 
negate the condition. See, e.g.f Marton Remodeling v. 
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Jensen, 706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985) (writing "not full payment" 
below the condition); Air Van Lines, Inc. v. Buster, 673 P.2d 
774 (Alaska 1983) (sending a letter stating the payment had 
been applied to the debt, and reserving the right to seek 
further sums); Welbourne & Purdy, Inc. v. Mahon, 388 N.Y.S.2d 
369 (Ct. App. 1976) (commencing a lawsuit before negotiating 
the check); Braudaway v. United Equitable Insurance Co. , 208 
So.2d 359 (La. App. 1968) (payee's attorney writing a letter 
rejecting the condition); Cove View Excavating & Construction 
Co. v. Flynn, 88 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah App. 1988) (crossing 
out the restrictive language on advice of counsel). See 
generally. Annotation, Modern Status of Rule that Acceptance 
of Check Purporting to be Final Settlement of Disputed Amount 
Constitutes Accord and Satisfaction, 42 A.L.R. 4th 12 (1985) 
and cases collected therein. 
Since the trial court did not specify which elements of 
the defense it believed Mountain Bell had or had not proved, 
it is necessary to review the evidence on each element, to 
establish that Mountain Bell was entitled to a dismissal as a 
matter of law on the basis of accord and satisfaction. 
A. There was a bona fide dispute between the 
parties and the amount in controversy was 
unliquidated 
There can be no doubt that a bona fide dispute over an 
unliquidated amount existed between Estate and Mountain Bell. 
The contract between the parties did not specify a total 
price; rather, it was essentially a "time and materials" 
-17 
contract in which only the rates were specified.30 The 
amount that would eventually become due for contract services 
could not be predicted because it depended on that most 
variable of factors, the weather, as well as on the amount of 
time spent and the number of removals performed by Estate. 
Furthermore, the court found the applicable contract 
provisions to be ambiguous.31 That finding has not been 
challenged and must be accepted on appeal. An honest 
disagreement over the meaning of ambiguous terms must be 
assumed to be bona fide. That Mountain Bell's dispute of the 
bill for $30,162.50 was bona fide is indicated not only by 
the ambiguity of the contract and the variability of the 
factors on which the amount owing depended, but also by the 
fact that the bill included unauthorized charges of over 
$10,000 for the use of dump trucks. It is no wonder that 
Mountain Bell disputed the bill. 
There can be no doubt that the dispute related to a 
single unliquidated claim. There was a single contract 
between the parties; there was a single disputed final bill; 
and there was a single check sent in response to the bill. 
In Air Van Lines, Inc. v. Buster, 673 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1983) 
(quoted with approval by the Utah Supreme Court in Marton 
Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 609 (Utah 1985)), the 
court stated: "The authorities conclude that the entire 
3 0
 Exhibit 3 (Appendix D). 
3 1
 Transcript of Jan. 15 at 6-10. 
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claim, including both its disputed and undisputed elements, 
is unitary and not subject to division so long as the whole 
claim is unliquidated." 673 P.2d at 778. The facts in this 
case compel a similar conclusion as a matter of law. 
B. Mountain Bell tendered an amount in full 
satisfaction of the entire claim of 
Estate 
The trial court's principal error was in treating 
Estate's claim as being divisible, such that the check for 
$8,613.00 could be considered full payment of undisputed 
charges, leaving the disputed charges for further resolution. 
That conclusion ignores several critical considerations. It 
ignores the facts that after all the work had been completed, 
Estate submitted a single final bill for all of the work it 
had done at Alta, and that Mountain Bell responded to that 
bill with a single check and letter. It ignores the 
restrictive language in the letter that the check was 
tendered "in full satisfaction of contracted services." It 
ignores the further language in the letter warning that: "If 
vou are not willing to accept that sum, $8613.00 in full 
satisfaction of the sums due. DO NOT negotiate the check, for 
upon your negotiation of that check, we will treat the matter 
as fully paid." If Mountain Bell had treated Estate's claim 
as divisible, and had intended to fully pay only the 
undisputed portion of the bill, rather than to settle the 
whole claim, the quoted language would make no sense 
whatsoever. Finally, the trial court's conclusion flies in 
the face of the Utah Supreme Court's statement in Marton: 
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[W]here we are confronted with a single unliquidated 
claim, viz,, the balance owing on a "time and materials" 
contract. . . . the general rule applies, which is that 
an accord and satisfaction of a single claim is not 
avoided merely because the amount paid and accepted is 
only that which the debtor concedes to be due or that 
his view of the controversy is adopted in making the 
settlement. 
706 P.2d at 609. See also. Cove View Excavating & 
Construction Co. v. Flynn, 88 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah App. 
1988). Thus even if $8,613.00 was the amount that Mountain 
Bell conceded was due, the accord and satisfaction is still 
effective. 
In denying Mountain Bell's motion for summary judgment, 
Judge Murphy erroneously distinguished the present case from 
Marton, whose facts closely resemble the present conflict. 
In that case, Marton had billed Jensen $6,538.12 for services 
rendered on a "time and materials" contract. Jensen felt 
that the number of hours claimed by Marton Remodeling in its 
billing was "excessive." He therefore sent Marton Remodeling 
a check for $5,000, representing a certain price-per-hour 
amount Jensen felt obligated to pay. In other words, Jensen 
did not dispute that Marton Remodeling had actually performed 
some work; he simply accepted some of the total hours claimed 
and rejected others. 
Here, Mountain Bell similarly was in dispute with Estate 
over whether the total number of hours and days claimed to 
have been worked were actually worked as required by the 
contract. In support of its contention, Mountain Bell's 
letter contained a detailed account of the days it disputed, 
-20-
based on a weather report obtained from Alta Peruvian Lodge. 
The defendant in Marton probably did not have such a tool for 
verification at his disposal, yet he was still able to 
convince the Supreme Court that a bona fide dispute existed 
as to the number of hours he should be obligated to 
compensate. The fact that Mountain Bell took the trouble to 
verify its contention with objective data while the defendant 
in Marton subjectively labelled the hours claimed 
"excessive," should not work to penalize Mountain Bell and 
take the facts of this case out of Marton'& reasoning. 
In denying Mountain Bell's accord and satisfaction 
defense, Judge Murphy relied heavily on two decisions more 
than twenty years old where the Supreme Court was unable to 
find an accord and satisfaction in factually distinguishable 
settings involving multiple claims. See Bennett v. 
Robinson's Medical Mart. Inc. . 18 Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 
(1966) and Dillman v. Massey Ferguson. Inc.. 13 Utah 2d 142, 
369 P.2d 296 (1962). In Bennett, the controversy involved 
two claims by a salesman against his employer: one for his 
fixed monthly salary which was not in dispute and another for 
commissions claimed to be owing. The Court properly held 
that by paying the salesman an amount representing his fixed 
salary, the company was merely giving the salesman an amount 
to which he was unquestionably entitled. Whether commissions 
were due represented the only dispute between the two parties 
and for that dispute to be settled, new consideration would 
have to be supplied in addition to the original payment. See 
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Suaarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson. 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 
1980). 
Unlike the plaintiff in Bennett. Estate was not on a 
fixed salary with respect to removing snow from Mountain 
Bell's Alta office. The opportunity for work depended on an 
occurrence as unpredictable as snowfall accumulation on a 
private road, an event to which Estate can hardly claim it 
was unquestionably entitled, especially since the charges for 
removing snow even on days when snowfall exceeded four inches 
were clearly unliquidated. Given this variable, it is 
untenable for Estate to argue (much like the unsuccessful 
plaintiff in Marton) that it was "unquestionably entitled to 
the [$8,613.00] represented by the check, and [that] the only 
dispute was whether any further amount [should be 
forthcoming]." Marton, 706 P.2d at 608. 
Dillnian involved two claims by a dealer against a 
manufacturer for merchandise returned to the manufacturer 
upon termination of the dealership. The first claim was for 
merchandise accepted by the manufacturer, which was 
liquidated and not disputed; the check in question 
represented full payment on that claim. The second claim was 
for other merchandise which the manufacturer rejected, and 
for which no payment was made or offered. The Court held 
that the check for the first claim did not create an accord 
and satisfaction for the second claim. Thus Dillman is 
distinguishable on its facts from the present case, and the 
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trial court's reliance on it in the present case was 
misplaced. 
To extrapolate the holding in Dillman to artificially 
sever a single claim into multiple claims, as the trial court 
apparently did in the present case, dilutes the defense of 
accord and satisfaction to the point where it becomes 
meaningless. Obviously, by paying at least some part of a 
larger claim, a defendant will impliedly concede that a part 
of the entire amount is due. The plaintiff will be quick to 
agree with his rival that at least the conceded amount is 
owing, while continuing to assert that additional amounts 
should be forthcoming. To characterize the whole transaction 
as a series of separate claims, however, would place a 
defendant in the dubious position of admitting liability as 
to the sum tendered, although he merely intended by his 
payment to settle the entire disputed amount. Such a 
characterization would discourage parties from making 
settlements of disputed amounts, since the payor would fear 
that a court might view his accord payment as an admission of 
liability or partial payment when the payment was offered 
merely to avoid further controversy. The result would be 
contrary to the law's policy of encouraging settlement. See 
Marton, 706 P.2d at 610 ("The law favors compromise in order 
to limit litigation. Accord and satisfaction serves this 
goal.") 
The facts in the very recent case of Cove View 
Excavating & Construction Co. v. Flynn. 88 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 
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(Utah App. 1988) are remarkably similar to the facts in this 
case. In Cove View, the parties had oral agreements for the 
rental of defendants backhoe and a water pump to complete 
excavation work on a highway project. In both instances, the 
hourly or daily rates were set, but not the total number of 
hours or days to be worked. The plaintiff sent defendant an 
invoice for rental of the equipment based on a claimed number 
of hours and days of rental. The defendant disagreed with 
the invoice, based on his own time records. Accordingly, he 
sent the plaintiff a check for less than the invoice amount, 
with the notation "pmt in full to date labor & materials." 
On the advice of counsel, plaintiff crossed out the 
restrictive language on the check and negotiated it. 
The trial court in Cove View denied the defendants 
motion for summary judgment and at the trial granted judgment 
for the plaintiff on the basis that it was not "fair" for the 
defendant to raise a dispute regarding the hours billed by 
merely sending the check with restrictive language the court 
concluded had "no effect," and because the court 
characterized the check as payment on an "ongoing account;" 
hence the court concluded that the plaintiff had intended to 
accept the check as partial payment only. 
On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded for entry of 
judgment for the defendant, holding that under the above 
facts, th€i negotiating of the check created an accord and 
satisfaction, "notwithstanding [plaintiff's] lack of any 
actual intent to accept it as such." This Court held: 
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[Plaintiff] knew or reasonably should have known— 
from the nature of the rental agreement itself and 
from the language on the check — that [defendant] 
disputed [plaintiff's] computation of the total 
number of hours of equipment rental and was making 
an offer of accord and satisfaction. The trial 
court's finding to the contrary is clearly 
erroneous. 
88 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8. 
The undisputed facts in the present case compel a 
similar ruling by this Court that Mountain Bell tendered an 
amount in full satisfaction of Estate's entire claim and that 
Estate knew or should have known that fact at the time the 
check was negotiated. 
C. Estate accepted the tendered payment by 
negotiating the check. 
It is undisputed that Estate negotiated the $8,613.00 
check from Mountain Bell on October 28, 1985, almost three 
months after receiving the letter of June 14, 1985 that 
communicated the condition that negotiation of the check 
would constitute full settlement. Estate knew that the check 
referred to in the letter was the check for $8,613.00 that it 
had received earlier. Apparently neither Judge Murphy nor 
Judge Hanson considered the failure to enclose the check with 
the letter to be fatal to the accord and satisfaction, 
because neither mentioned it as a reason to reject the 
defense. 
In its Memorandum in Opposition to Mountain Bell's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Estate claimed that Mountain 
Bell cannot retroactively place conditions on its previous 
tender of a check (R. 77-79) . Such a view of accord and 
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satisfaction is inconsistent with the principles of contract 
law upon which the doctrine is based. This Court recently 
affirmed the concept that "the elements essential to 
contracts generally must be present in a contract of accord 
and satisfaction, including offer and acceptance, competent 
parties, and consideration.* Masonry Equipment & Supply v. 
Willco Associates, Inc. 755 P.2d 756, 758 (Utah. App. 1988), 
citing Golden Key Realty. Inc. v. Mantas. 699 P.2d 730, 732 
(Utah 1985). 
It is hornbook law that mutual assent can be inferred 
from a series of letters, documents and other correspondence 
sent between two parties. 1 Corbin on Contracts. § 31 (1952). 
Here, however, Estate seems to contend that the time of 
receipt of the check was the exclusive moment at which the 
minds of the two parties could meet, precluding Mountain Bell 
from completing its offer of settlement in a separate, later-
received letter. The proper focus of accord and 
satisfaction, however, is on the payee's knowledge at the 
time of the alleged acceptance, rather than on the sequence 
of events leading up to such acceptance. 
The moment the creditor indorses and collects the check 
with knowledge that it is offered in full satisfaction 
of a disputed claim, he thereby agrees to the condition 
and is estopped from denying such agreement. It is then 
that the minds of the parties meet and the contract of 
accord and satisfaction becomes complete. 
1 Am.Jur.2d. Accord and Satisfaction, § 18 (1962) (emphasis 
added) . This Court similarly held as a matter of law in 
Masonry that "the parties reached an accord and satisfaction 
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when [the payee1 accepted and cashed the check." 755 P.2d at 
758 (emphasis added). See also. Miller v. Prince Street 
Elevator Co. , 68 P.2d 663, 665 (N.M. 1937) (cited with 
approval in Marton) ("the moment the [creditor] cashed the 
check, the minds of the parties met, and they mutually agreed 
that it constituted full payment"). Because Estate knew at 
the time of indorsement of the check and placement of it in 
the bank-collection process that it had been offered in full 
satisfaction of the entire disputed amount, it is irrelevant 
that receipt of the check preceded receipt of the letter. 
Estate claims that it treated the check as a partial 
payment upon receipt, thus defeating the later-imposed 
condition that negotiation would result in full satisfaction 
of the claim. Such a claim is contrary to both the law and 
the facts. That the check was not treated as a partial 
payment is shown not only from the failure to negotiate it 
immediately, but from the facts that the payment was never 
entered on Estate's ledger and that when Estate filed its 
lawsuit, it claimed the full amount of $30,162.50, rather 
than the lesser amount of $21,549.50, which it should have 
claimed if the "partial payment" had been applied to the 
bill. (R. 2) Significantly, Estate did not amend its 
complaint to claim the lesser amount until well after the 
check had been negotiated. (R. 24) 
In claiming that receipt of the check constituted 
"partial payment" of the entire account, Estate misconstrues 
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Utah law governing negotiable instruments. Utah Code Ann. § 
70A-3-802(l)(b) (1980) provides: 
Unless otherwise agreed where an instrument is taken for 
an underlying obligation . . . in any other case the 
obligation is suspended pro tanto until the instrument 
is due or if it is payable on demand until its 
presentment. If the instrument is dishonored action may 
be maintained on either the instrument or the 
obligation; discharge of the underlying obligor on the 
instrument also discharges him on the obligation. 
(emphasis added) Thus, until Estate presented the check for 
collection, the underlying obligation was suspended, 
permitting further negotiations and action by Mountain Bell 
with respect thereto. The "unless otherwise agreed" language 
that prefcices Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-802 (1) (b) merely serves 
to recognize the freedom of parties to enter into an accord 
and satisfaction agreement, thus discharging an obligation 
where there would otherwise be suspension of the debt. See 
Brimley v. Gasser. 754 P.2d 97 (Utah App. 1988). Estate does 
not allege, nor can it in good faith allege, that the two 
parties had "agreed" that transfer of the check would operate 
to discharge only part of the obligation.32 In th€> absence 
of such an agreement, the entire obligation was suspended 
until October 28, 1985, when Estate presented the instrument 
3 2
 On the contrary, receipt of the check by itself was 
sufficient to put Estate on notice that Mountain Bell 
considered the check to discharge the entire underlying 
obligation. Estate's bill for $30,162.50 required the total 
amount to be paid in a lump sum, with nothing to suggest that 
payments were to be made progressively or in installments. 
Cf. Keppard v. International Harvester Co.. 581 F.2d 764, 767 
(9th Cir. 1978). 
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for payment, having full knowledge of Mountain Bell's offer 
of accord and the consequences of negotiation of the check.33 
The fact that Estate's attorney sent Mountain Bell a 
demand letter after receiving the check but before Mountain 
Bell's letter was received is of no consequence. The fact 
remains that Estate did not negotiate the check until well 
after it had received Mountain Bell's letter imposing a 
condition on negotiating the check. Even if Mountain Bell 
had formulated its letter and offer of accord after receiving 
Estate's attorney's letter (although there is no evidence to 
support such a finding), the negotiation of the check would 
have created an accord and satisfaction, because it was not 
the receipt or retention of the check which triggered the 
agreement, but the negotiation of the check.34 
At the time Estate received Mountain Bell's letter, 
having not yet negotiated the check, it had only two choices: 
it could return the check and pursue the full amount of its 
33The immateriality of the sequence in which the check 
and its restrictive conditions were received can be 
illustrated by the following hypothetical: By mailing the 
check, Mountain Bell had issued an order to its bank to make 
payment; thus, the check represented merely a promise to pay, 
the payment on which Mountain Bell could have stopped at any 
time prior to presentment. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-4-
403(1). Mountain Bell could have then reissued another check 
for $8,613.00, accompanied by the restrictive conditions. 
The same result was accomplished by simply issuing the 
restrictive conditions while the first check was 
unnegotiated, and was thus merely a promise to pay. 
34
 Estate's attorney admitted that the reason the 
original complaint prayed for the full amount of $30,162.50 
was that at the time the complaint was filed, the check had 
not been cashed. Transcript of Jan. 12 at 17. 
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claim, or it could cash the check and thereby waive any 
further claim. By seeking to have its cake and eat it too 
(i.e. cashing the check and pursuing the balance of the 
claim), Estate ignored the law of accord and satisfaction and 
must suffer the consequences. As stated in Marton, "when a 
bona fide dispute arises . . . and a check is tendered in 
full payment of an unliquidated claim as we have here, 
arising out of a 'time and materials' contract, the creditor 
may not disregard the condition attached. . . . 'The law gave 
the plaintiffs the choice of accepting the check on 
defendant's terms or of returning it.'" 706 P.2d at 609-10 
(quoting from Graff am v. Geronda, 304 A. 2d 76 (Me. 1973)) 
(emphasis added). See also Danac, Inc. v. Gudenau & Company. 
Inc., 751 P.2d 947, 950 (Alaska 1988). 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN ORDERING 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST TO BE COMPOUNDED AGAINST MOUNTAIN 
BELL. 
The trial court's order for prejudgment interest to be 
compounded against Mountain Bell has no basis in statute or 
Utah case law. Neither Utah Code Ann. Section 15-1-1 (legal 
rate of interest) nor Utah Code Ann. Section 15-1-4 (judgment 
rate of interest), provide any justification for ordering 
interest to be compounded. In 1979, the Utah Supreme Court 
criticized a similar trial court order for compounded 
interest, stating: 
the court in calculating the amount of the judgment, 
compounded the interest annually on the unpaid amounts 
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due. This is not proper. Compounded interest is not 
favored by law. 
Watkins & Faber v. Whitelev. 592 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1979) 
(emphasis added), citing Goodwin v. Northwestern Mutual Life 
Ins. Co.. 196 Wash. 391, 83 P.2d 231 (1938), and Musser v. 
Murphy, 49 Idaho 141, 286 P. 618 (1930). 
In the absence of a contractual agreement to the 
contrary, a trial court is not justified in ordering 
prejudgment interest to be compounded. See Watkins & Faber. 
592 P.2d at 616. Thus the trial court committed reversible 
error by ordering the prejudgment interest in this case to be 
compounded. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court denied Mountain Bell a fair opportunity 
to have its accord and satisfaction defense evaluated 
neutrally when it relied on the prior judge's denial of the 
motion for summary judgment as being the law of the case. 
The undisputed facts establish every element necessary to 
thedefense of accord and satisfaction. There was a bona fide 
dispute over an unliquidated amount owing on a "time and 
materials" contract. Mountain Bell tendered a check for less 
than the full amount in full satisfaction of the entire 
claim, not just as partial payment for undisputed amounts. 
At the time Estate negotiated the check, it was clearly on 
notice and knew that Mountain Bell intended and imposed a 
condition that negotiation of the check would result in full 
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settlement. Yet Estate took the risk of negotiating the 
check, which created the accord and satisfaction. That 
Estate did not wish that result (which is true of every 
plaintiff against whom an accord and satisfaction defense 
prevails) is irrelevant. On these facts, which are 
undisputed or which represent the great weight of evidence on 
the record, Mountain Bell is entitled to a dismissal of 
Estate's complaint as a matter of law. 
Request for Relief 
Mountain Bell respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse the judgment entered herein, and to remand to the 
District Court with directions to dismiss Estate's complaint 
with prejudice. In the alternative, Mountain Bell requests 
that the case be remanded to the district court with 
directions to make specific findings on the accord and 
satisfaction issue, and to modify the judgment to eliminate 
the compounding of prejudgment interest. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ^ day of August, 1988. 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 
Floy<Lsk. Jensen, Attorney 
for Appellant 
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A. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Lowell V. Summerhavs - 3154 
LAW OFFICES OF LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4609 South State Street 
P.O. Box 1355 
Sandy, Utah 84091-1355 
Telephone: (801) 942-8008 
David D. Loreman - 4366 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 520033 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152 
Telephone: (801) 261-2887 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE' OF UTAH 
ESTATE LANDSCAPE AND SNOW ] 
REMOVAL SPECIALISTS, INC., ] 
a Utah corporation, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ; 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE ] 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Civil No.: C85-5197 
) Judge: Timothy R. Hanson 
The above-entitled matter, having come on regularly before 
the Court, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding, the Plain-
tiff having been represented by Lowell V. Summerhays and David D. 
Loreman, and the Defendant having been represented by Floyd 
Jensen, and upon the trial of this matter having been heard, the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were made: 
1 
00C27Q 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFIC F%alt Lake County Utan 
APR-11938 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that tnere was a contract and that the 
parties were governed by the contract. 
2. The Court finds that the work was not substandard. 
3. The Court finds that tne contract was breached by the 
Plaintiff's failure to submit monthly balance statements, how-
ever, the Court finds that the breach was not material. 
4. The Court finds that the true intent of the parties was 
that the Plaintiff was entitled to bill for each four (4) inches 
of snow removed; the contract was not clear and is ambiguous. 
5. The Court finds that the Bobcat was a front load and 
was within the terms of the contract. The following year the 
Defendant again agreed to its use at $55.00 per hour. 
6. The Court finds that tne Plaintiff was to get authori-
zation for the use of further equipment, and that the dump truck 
was not authorized. 
7. The Court finds that the $10,000.00 limit on the con-
tract was waived by all parties based upon the conduct of all of 
the parties. 
8. The Court finds regarding the issue of damages that 
Defendant has not paid Plaintiff for plowing and the use of the 
front loader costs. 
9. The Court finds that the total bill was $30,162.50, and 
the amount disputed is $21,549.50. The Court finds that the 
amount paid by Mt. Bell on the total bill was $8,613.00. 
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10. The Court finds that the following dates and amounts 
were not paid by Mt. Bell, and that these amounts do not include 
additional sums for the use of dump trucks. 
DATE AMOUNT 
1984 $ 990.00 
1/08/85 255.00 
1/21/85 255.00 
1/26/85 550.00 
2/01/85 170.00 
2/04/85 510.00 
2/05/85 425.00 
2/06/85 425.00 
2/07/85 510.00 
2/08/85 340.00 
2/11 - 12/85 1,320.ng 
2/13/85 1,017.50 
2/15/85 170.00 
2/18/85 255.00 
2/20/85 907.50 
2/22/85 170.00 
2/23/85 170.00 
2/25/85 170.00 
2/27/85 170.00 
3/02/85 255.00 
3/06/85 425.00 
3/07/85 170.00 
3/10/85 170.00 
3/15/85 170.00 
3/16/85 255.00 
3/18/85 255.00 
3/20/85 255.00 
3/25/85 255.00 
TOTAL: $ 10,990.00 
11. The Court finds that interest accrued on the amount due 
and owing from April 16, 1985, at ten percent (10%) compounded 
per annum, until the date this judgment is entered. Thereafter, 
the judgment will run at twelve percent (12%) per annum, at the 
maximum legal rate, plus cost, per Rule 54, Utah Code of Civil 
Procedures. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Based on the Court's Finding of Facts, it is hereby 
concluded that there was no accord and satisfaction in that the 
Order of Judge Michael R. Murphy delineated the area fully and is 
the law of the case. Even if it were not the law of the case, 
Exhibit 6 introduced into evidence did not fulfill the require-
ments of an accord and satisfaction. 
2. Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts, this Court 
concludes that there was a written contract and the theories of 
quantum merit and unjust enrichment do not apply in this case. 
3. The Court also concludes that there were ambiguities in 
the contract and as the contract was drafted by Defendant Mt. 
States Telephone and Telegraph, that the contract must be con-
strued against the party who drafted it. 
•4. Based upon the Findings of Fact in this case, it is 
hereby concluded that Defendant is responsible for payment on 
each increment of four (A) inches, and the time charged for the 
Bobcat, and that no dump trucks were allowed based on no prior 
written modifications of the contract to include such dump 
trucks, and therefore, all costs relating to those dump trucks 
are found not to be part of the contract. 
5. IT IS THEREFORE CONCLUDED, based on the foregoing 
Findings of Fact, that Estate Landscape and Snow Removal Special-
ists, Inc. had fulfilled their contract to Mt. States Telephone 
and Telegraph Co., and that there is a sum due and owing to Es-
tate Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. in the amount 
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of $10,990.00, plus interest from April 15, 1985, at the rate of 
ten percent (10%) per annum, compounded annually, until the date 
this judgment is entered. Thereafter, interest will be calcula-
ted at twelve percent (12%) per annj/n, including costs of court. 
DATED this / day o/ LA'pAAjL , 1983. 
HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ^fj day of 
March, 1988, I caused to be hand delivered a copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to: 
Floyd A. Jensen, Esq, 
Mountain States Telephone 4 Telegraph Co. 
250 Bell Plaza, Room 1610 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant. 
JJWMAL fi.^u*. 
00G274 
B. JUDGMENT 
Lowell V. Summerhays - 3154 
LAW OFFICES OF LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4609 South State Street 
P.O. Box 1355 
Sandy, Utah 84091-1355 
Telephone: (801) 942-8008 
David D. Loreman - 4366 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 520033 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152 
Telephone: (801) 261-2887 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Sail Lake County Utah 
APR - 1 1938 
H DlxCn H'r.yfey. Ci^erd Oist. Court/ 
By -_: • Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
•^b, a\a nn.^qqq 
ESTATE LANDSCAPE AND SNOW 
REMOVAL SPECIALISTS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
4-v-SS- 3'35 p ^ 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No.: CK5-5197 
Judge: Timothy R. Hanson 
The above-entitled matter, having come on regularly 
before the Court, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding, the 
Plaintiff having been represented by Lowell V. Summerhays and 
David D. Loreman and the Defendant having been represented by 
Floyd Jensen, and upon the trial of this matter having been 
heard, 
00C27S 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
Based on the Court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions 
of Law, the Court enters judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and 
against the Defendant in the anount of $10,990,00, plus interest 
at the legal pre-judgment rate of ten percent (10%) sinple inter-
est per annum, compounded annually since the due date of April 
15, 1985, to the date the judgment is entered. Thereafter, it 
will run at twelve percent (12%) per anj/um at maximum legal rate, 
plus costs, per Rule 54 of the Utah C/5de of Civil procedure. 
DATED this J_ day/f fifJuil
 L 1988. 
By 
mothy R. Hanson 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HSNOL5Y 
>Cf^ sl>(-~ -lC 
O :f' 
^J<Jff» 
HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2±- day of 
March, 1988, I caused to be hand delivered a copy of the 
foregoing JUDGMENT to: 
Floyd A. Jensen, Esq. 
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co* 
250 Bell Plaza, Room 1610 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant. 
f)muid/i. fi.^Qp/^x 
000276 
C. SUMMARY DECISION DENYING MOUNTAIN BELL'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
•_»-w 11^ v^u ,nrv o vjrr!V/rr 
Salt Lake County Utah 
DEC ^9 1986 
H. Dixon Hii 
/ 
lark 3rd Dial. Court 
y////tu// By ''/44/f.. \ / ///nv 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ESTATE LANDSCAPE AND SNOW 
REMOVAL SPECIALISTS, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
SUMMARY DECISION 
AND ORDER 
CIVIL NO. -e-85=3333T 
&&?V7?7 
This Summary Decision and Order is for the purpose of apprising 
the parties and counsel of the grounds for the court1 s ruling 
and accompanying Order, A more elaborate, extensive and polished 
memorandum decision in this case is not necessary and would 
serve no useful purpose. 
The issue presented is whether, under the undisputed facts 
in this case, there was an accord and satisfaction absolving 
defendant from all claims of the plaintiff for alleged breaches 
of the November 15, 1985 contract for snow removal ("the contract") • 
The discovery, defendant's memorandum of law, and Exhibit "C" 
thereto indicate that the defendant's refusal to pay the full 
amount claimed was premised on its interpretation of Exhibit 
"A" to the contract and specifically paragraph D thereof entitled 
"Rates and Charges." It was defendant's position expressed 
ESTATE LANDSCAPING V. 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELE. PAGE TWO SUMMARY DECISION 
in its letter of June 14, 1985 that it would not pay for snow 
removal on the specified dates when weather records indicated 
snow accumulations of less than four inches• No other basis 
for disputing the claims exist in the record before this court 
on defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. There is no dispute 
that the amounts tendered were in fact owed in accordance with 
the terms of the contract. 
This case is controlled by Marton Remodeling v. Jensen, 
706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985). In applying Marton Remodeling to 
the case at bar it is necessary to determine whether the plaintiff's 
original assertions constituted a single claim. In resolving 
this matter, the court cannot artificially bifurcate a single 
dispute in determining whether the purported accord and satisfaction 
extinguished all of plaintiff's claims. Generally, the court 
would be reluctant to suggest that more than one claim exists 
in circumstances where the dispute arises under a single written 
contract. This case, however, is controlled by contrary precedent. 
The Supreme Court in Marton Remodeling set forth two examples 
of circumstances where the dispute involved more than one claim. 
It did so by citing with approval its decisions in Bennett v. Robin-
son's Medical Mart, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 (1966), 
and Dillman v. Massey Ferguson, Inc>. 13 Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2d 
296 (1962). 
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ESTATE LANDSCAPING V. 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELE. PAGE THREE SUMMARY DECISION 
In Dillman the parties entered into a contract for the 
termination of a dealership which included a provision whereby 
the defendant was to purchase unused parts. Defendant sorted 
through the parts, accepted some, returned others, and tendered 
a check for only the parts accepted. The Court held that the 
cashing of the checks did not constitute an accord and satisfaction 
as to those parts rejected and returned to plaintiff. Whereas 
the Court in Dillman may have placed some reliance on the language 
of the purported release as being consistent with its ruling, 
the Court in Marton Remodeling expressly distingusihed Dillman 
as a case which "involved two claims." 706 P.2d at 609. 
This court cannot distinguish Dillman from the instant 
case. Much like the defendant in Dillman, the defendant here 
accepted some claims and rejected others. As in Dillman, there 
appears to be no dispute as to those claims paid. To paraphrase 
Dillman: "The dispute was not as to the amount found due for 
[the services paid] but as to whether [defendant] breached its 
contract by refusing to [pay for all services rendered]." 369 
P.2d at 298. As in Dillman. the services paid for by defendant 
were a liquidated amount for snow removal on the occasions when 
there was no contract dispute concerning accumulation. The 
doctrine of accord and satisfaction generally applies only to 
unliquidated claims. See, Calamari & Perillo, Contracts, Sections 
4-10 to -12 (2d Ed. 1977). 
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MOUNTAIN STATES TELE. PAGE FOUR SUMMARY DECISION 
Whereas there are other factors not referenced in this 
Summary Decision and Order supporting denial of summary judgment 
(e.g., intent, consideration, date of acceptance of payment, 
and the reasonable expectations of the parties) , the Dillman 
case, in light of its interpretation and approval in Marton 
Remodeling, alone requires denial of defendant's Motion. 
For the reasons set forth herein, defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is denied. 
Dated this 29th day of December; 1986. 
rrrwAtfT. p. MTTPPHV f MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
G00130 
ESTATE LANDSCAPING V. 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELE. PAGE FIVE SUMMARY DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Summary Decision and Order, postage prepaid, 
to the following, this &'? day of December, 1986: 
James W. Carter 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Floyd A. Jensen 
Attorney for Defendant 
250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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D. CONTRACT (EXHIBIT 3) 
LETTER AGREEMENT 
(SNOW REMOVAL - INSURANCE WAIVED) 
November 15 . 1984 
Room 212 
Phoenix, AZ 85014 
It is agreed that the undersigned will provide services, in a good and 
workmanlike manner for all work hereinafter described. Such services shall 
commence under this Agreement on December 1 , 1984 , and continue 
through and Including November 31 1985 . Thereafter, either 
of us may terminate this agreement on thirty (30) days written notice to the 
other. 
In doing this work, the undersigned will act as an independent contractor 
throughout, and although the work will have to be completed to your 
satisfaction, the actual details of the work will be under the control of the 
undersigned. The undersigned shall also comply, at the expense of the 
undersigned, with applicable provisions of workmen's compensation laws, 
unemployment compensation laws, federal social security law, the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, and all other applicable federal, state and local laws and 
regulations relating to terms and conditions of employment required to be 
fulfilled by employers. 
The work shall be done to your satisfaction and in accordance with your 
specifications, as applicable. The undersigned will obtain and pay for all 
licenses and permits required by law with respect to any work covered by this 
Agreement. 
If the work hereunder is not performed to your satisfaction, the undersigned 
agrees that, upon receiving verbal notice from you, the undersigned will 
remedy and deficiencies of which you give notice within five (5) working days 
and, if such deficiency is not remedied, agrees that you may deduct from any 
monies due the undersigned any amounts necessary to correct the deficiencies. 
Further, you may also terminate this Agreement, immediately. 
The undersigned will not subcontract any work nor assign any interests under 
this Agreement without your prior written consent. You may assign this 
agreement at anytime and the undersigned agrees that you will have no further 
liability hereunder after such assignment. 
The undersigned hereby assumes full responsibility for and shall indemnify and 
save you harmless from all claims, losses, liens, expenses, suits and 
attorneys1 fees for injuries to or death of any person and for damages to 
any property, including but not limited to, damages to your property and 
injury to or death of your agents, or employees, which may in any way arise 
out of the performance of or failure to perform the work contemplated-herein, 
except to the extent such injury, damage or death is caused by the negligence 
of you, your agents or employees. 
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In view of the extent of the work hereunder and the nature of the business o" 
the undersigned, it is the understanding of the undersigned that ycu will not 
require the undersigned to take out and maintain workmen's compensation, 
general liability insurance, and automobile liability insurance. However, at 
your request, the undersigned, at the expense of the undersigned will take* out 
and maintain insurance as you may require should the extent of the work be 
modified or the nature of the undersigned's business change. The undersigneo 
shall advise you of any change or modification in the number of emplo>ees, if 
any, employed by the undersigned. 
Unless exempt under the rules and regulations of the Secretary of Lafcor ox 
other proper authority, this Agreement is subject to applicable laws and 
executive orders relating to Equal Opportunity and nondiscrimination in 
employment. The parties hereto shall not discriminate in their employment 
practices against any person by reason of race, religion, color, sex or 
national origin and agree to comply with the provisions of said laws and 
orders, as well as all laws and orders relating to the employment of the 
handicapped, the employment of veterans and the use of minority businass 
enterprises, to the extent any such laws and orders are applicable in the 
performance of the work or furnishing of services, materials or supplies 
hereunder. For this purpose, the provisions of such laws £nd orders and 
pertinent regulations issued thereunder, as now enforced or hereafter amended, 
shall be deemed an Integral part of this Agreement to the same extent as if 
written at length herein. 
The work shall be performed at the following location(s) and within tie 
following hours as described in Exhibit A and Exhibit 8 attached hereto amd 
incorporated herein by reference. 
The undersigned shall furnish all equipment, materials, and supplies, for the 
use of the undersigned in the performance of the work under this Agreement. 
Payment shall be made by you to the undersigned within thirty (30) days after 
receipt of proper billing invoices with supporting documentation, if 
appropriate, from the undersigned, in accordance with the scale set forth in 
Exhibit A, for all work completed under this Agreement through the last day of 
the preceding month. 
If the Agreement expressed herein meets with your approval and assent, please 
indicate your acceptance of the Agreement in the space provided below for that 
purpose and return said copy to the undersigned. 
Estate Landscape & Maintenance THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
CONTRACTOR AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 
'—N ^ 
By ^..A^Xrl^v^ 
T i t l e G ( i f t c g x \ < f ry , C N C Q A te 
Address: 3089 Little Cottonwood Rd. 
By 
Title 
Data 
/'//(< (t /> Jf, '• 
Hanaqer Reoorts Center 
1 i ' ) A ) 
Sandy, Utah 84070 T^tK AGREEMENI-4EG0TIATEC/BID 
ltle Assistant Manager 
Contract Adm. 
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EXHIBIT A 
Description of work: To provide all labor, materials & 
incidentals necessary to: Maintain a snow-free condition on 
all parking lots including loading dock areas and stairwells 
as applicable, whenever the snow reaches 2" or as requested 
by Mountain Bell Real Estate Personel. 
Location of work: 673050 Salt Lake ESS 500 S. Wasatch 
673079 Cottonwood ESS 3480 Danish 
674171 Riverton ESS 2690 W. 126000 S 
674269 Draper EQ 11351 S. 100 E. 
673140 Alst Main Alta Canyon 
674104 4282 W. 1730 S. 
C. Time Limits for performance of work: 
The work performed should be completed on Sunday thru 
Saturday prior to 6:00 a.m. or when the accumalation is 2' 
or more. 
Rates and Charges: 
674104 4282 W. 1730 S. 
673050 500 S. Wasatch 
674171 12600 S. 2690 W. 
673079 3480 Danish 
674269 11351 S.100 E. 
673140 Alta Main * 
$140.00 per removal 
$40.00 per removal 
$35.00 per removal 
$60.00 per removal 
$60.00 per removal 
$85.00 per removal at 4" 
The contract amount shall not exceed $10,000.00 during the contract 
period. Price includes all sales tax. 
Definition of when each labor rate applies: 
Snow Plowing The snow shall be plowed at Alta Main (673140) 
when the snow reaches 4 inches. The cost is to 
be $85.00 per removal or $55.0Q for the front 
end loader and operator as required. This price 
includes all sales tax. 
The snow is not to be plowed down Co the black 
top at Alta Main in Alta Canyon. 
Snow Hauling: N/A 
E. Material Charges: Salt 
The rate per application of salt for the small locations 
shall be $30.00. The rate for Alta Main is $50.00 per 
application 
F. Other charges and when applicaple, (if any): 
N/A 
EXHIBIT B 
SNOW REMOVAL SPECIFICATIONS 
GENERAL 
Contractor shall perform it's services hereunder (a) in strict 
compliance with all applicable State, County, Municipal, and 
administrative laws, ordinances, rules and regulations including 
those pertaining to environmental protection and sarety, (b) in 
a worlananlike manner and (c) to the satisfaction of the Company, 
Contractor will provide all labor, transportation, tools, implements, 
appliances, materials, supplies, and insurance required to perform 
the services herein described, 
SCOPE OF WORK 
Contractor will clear snow and ice from the following areas as 
they may apply and before 6:00 A.M., unless otherwise specified: 
1. Sidewalk 
2. Steps 
3 . Driveway 
4. Parking areas 
The service is to be performed when more than two (2) inches of 
snow has accumulated on the site or as directed by the authorised 
Mountain Bell representative. 
OTHER SERVICES 
In addition to basic snow removal, the Company may also request 
Contractor to provide incidental or special services from time to 
time on an hourly rate, piece rate, or lump sum basis as mutually 
agreed to by the parties. Such services shall be subject to the 
terms and conditions of the agreement. Such incidental or special 
services shall be covered per written instructions containing a 
description of the services to be furnished and specifying location, 
time, completion date(s), rates and/or charges, and any other sig-
nificant conditions for the performance of the service. 
CONTRACTOR SUPERVISION 
Contractor shall designate a representative who shall, during all 
times that any of Contractor's employees are performing services 
on Company premises, be available by telephone and responsible for 
the proper performance of Contractors employees of the services 
hereunder. Contractor shall provide sufficient supervision of said 
employees and the services performed to assure results satisfactory 
to the Company. 
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BILLING AND PAYMENTS 
At the end of each of Contractor1! billing periods, in which ejch 
period shall not exceed one (1) month, Contractor shall render to 
the Company a bill for the amount owed to Contractor for services 
rendered during that period. Each bill shall be computed on the 
basis of the rates and/or charges agreed upon in the Agreement 
and shall be delivered to the Company at such address the Company 
may designate. Each such bill shall be paid by the Company within 
thirty (30) days after receipt. Such payments shall constitute 
full compensation to Contractor for performance of said services 
including Contractor's direct costs, overhead, and other indirect 
costs and profits. 
TERMINATION 
(a) Company may terminate the Agreement and/or cancel any written 
instructions executed hereunder by giving Contractor seventy-two 
(72) hours prior written notice. If such termination and/or 
cancellation is for reasons other than Contractor's failure to 
comply with the terms of the Agreement or any associated written 
instructions, the Company shall pay Contractor for services 
performed up to the date Contractor receives Company's notice, an 
amount computed on the basis of the rates, or a proration of the 
sums, specified in the Agreement(s) authorizing such services. If 
such termination and/or cancellation is due to failure of Contractor 
to comply with the terms of the Agreement or any associated written 
instructions, Company shall pay Contractor for services performed 
to the Company's satisfaction, an amount agreeable to Company and 
predicated upon the rates, or a proration of th^ sums, specified 
in the written instructions authorizing such services. 
(b) Except for claims for payments provided for in paragraph VI(a) 
above, if the Agreement and/or any associated written instructions 
are terminated or cancelled pursuant to paragraph VI(a), Contractor 
agrees to waive and does hereby waive all claims against Company 
for profits, loss or damage because of such termination or cancel-
lation. 
HOLIDAYS 
Scheduled s e r v i c e s that f a l l on hol idays observed by Company (New 
Year's Day, Washington's Birthday, Memorial Day, Independence Day, 
Labor Day, Veteran's Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day) may 
be omitted unless otherwise s p e c i f i e d . 
SECURITY 
(a) At Company's request, Contractor shall promptly remove from 
Company's premises any employee of Contractor who in Company's 
opinion has been negligent, dishonest or otherwise unsatisfactory 
in performing his or her duties hereunder. However, a request for 
such removal shall in no way be interpreted to require dismissal 
or other disciplinary action of the employee by Contractor. 
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SECURITY (cont'd) 
(b) Contractor shall report to Company promptly any> hazardous or 
unusual condition existing on premises of Company. The Company 
may require Contractor1s employees to wear Company-supplied iden-
tification badges while on Company premises. Contractor agrees 
that it shall not duplicate any Company keys, and it shall return 
all Company keys and identification badges to the Company Represen-
tative immediately upon termination of this agreement. If the 
Contractor fails to return such keys and badges within five (5) 
days after termination, Company may withhold any payment due 
Contractor until all such property is returned, and Contractor 
agrees that it shall be responsible for, and shall indemnify the 
Company against, all damages, costs and expenses resulting from 
the loss or destruction of any such keys including, but not limited 
to, expenses incurred by the Company in reordering locks and re-
issuing keys, 
(c) In the event of theft or loss of property attributable to the 
Contractor, his employees, subcontractors or invitees, the Con-
tractor agrees to replace the property and/or reimburse the Company 
the replacement value of the item. 
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR 
Contractor hereby declares and agrees that Contractor is engaged in 
an independent business and will perform it's obligations hereunder 
as an independent contractor and not as the agent, employee or 
servant of Company; that Contractor has and hereby retains the right 
to exercise full control of and supervision over the performance of 
Contractor's obligations hereunder and full control over the employ-
ment, direction, compensation, and discharge of all employees 
assisting in the performance of such obligations; that Contractor 
will be solely responsible for all matters relating to payment of 
such employees, including compliance with social security, with-
holding and all other regulations governing such matters; and that 
Contractor will be responsible for Contractor1 s own acts and those 
of Contractor's subordinates, employees, agents, and subcontractors 
during the performance of Contractor's obligations hereunder. 
Contractor shall not employ to perform services hereunder any person 
who is a full or part-time employee of the Company. 
INDEMNITY 
(a) Contractor shall indemnify Company and its officers, agents, 
and employees, and each of them against, and shall hold them, and 
each of them, harmless of and from: 
(1) Any loss, cost, damage, claim, expense, or liabilit7 by 
reason of injury to or death of any person or damage to 
or destruction or loss of any property arising out of, 
as a result of, or in connection with the performance of 
this Agreement and directly or indirectly caused, in 
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INDEMNITY (cont'd) 
whole or in part, by or claimed to have been caused by 
any act or omission, negligent or therwise, of Contractor 
or Contractor's agents or employees regardless of the 
negligence of Company or its agents, or employees, be it 
active or passive, except where such loss, cost, damage, 
claim, expense, or liability arises from the sole 
negligence or willful misconduct of Company, its oficers, 
agents, or employees, or is caused by the sole negligence 
or willful misconduct or Company's independent contractor 
(other than Contractor) who, at the time of such loss, 
cost, damage, claim, expense or liability was directly 
responsible to Company. As used in the preceding 
sentence, the words "any person" shall include, but shall 
not be limited to, a subcontractor or an agent of Company 
or Contractor and an employee of Company, Contractor or 
any such subcontractor or agent; and the words "any 
property" shall include, but shall not be limited to, 
property of the Company, Contractor or any such sub-
contractor or agent, or an employee of any of them; and 
(2) Any and all penalties imposed on account of the violation of 
any law, ordinance, order, rule, regulation, condition, or 
requirement in any way related, directly c^r indirectly, to 
Contractor's performance hereunder, compliance with which 
is left by Agreement to the part of Contractor. 
LIENS/ENCUMBRANCES 
Contractor shall not permit liens or encumbrances to be filed against 
Company property by reason of Contractor's (or its subcontractors) 
failure to pay for labor performed or materials furnished hereunder; 
shall cause any such lien or encumbrance which may be filed to be 
released and discharged or record forthwith; and shall hold Company 
harmless from any such lien or encumbrance. Company may, if it deems 
it necessary, cause any such lien or encumbrance to be released; and 
Contractor shall reimburse Company for all costs incurred on that 
account, or Company may reimburse itself therefor from funds other-
wise due Contractor hereunder. 
WAIVERS, AMENDMENTS AND MODIFICATIONS 
No provision of the Agreement shall be deemed waived, amended or 
modified by either party, unless such waiver, amendment or modification 
be in writing signed by the authorized representative of the party 
against whom it is sought to enforce such waiver, amendment or modifi-
cation. For the purposes of this paragraph, the term "authorized 
representative" shall mean only the person executing the Agreement or 
that person's respective successor or superior, if any. 
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XIII. ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT 
In the event of a large snow storm, th« rental of additional equip-
ment is necessary to service Company's account, Contractor aust 
first obtain the approval of the Field Porce Assistant Manager. 
After rental of additional equipment, Contractor shall submit a 
copy of invoice for rental charges with monthly bill for snow 
removal to Company for payment. It shall be Contractors respon-
sibility to pay for the additional equipment at the time of rental. 
XIV. ACCOUNTABILITY OF CONTRACTS FOR RECORDS 
Contractor shall maintain complete, legible, and accurate records 
of all services and products charged to Company and costs incurred 
in the performance of this Agreement for three (3) years from the 
date of termination or cancellation. Company shall have the right, 
through its designated representatives, to examine and audit at 
all reasonable times and places, all such records and other records 
and accounts as may, under recognized accounting practices, contain 
information bearing upon amount payable to Contractor hereunder. 
5 
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Estate o 
^~^ "Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists" 
tuauiMLa 3089 Little Cottonwood Road 
Sandy, Utah 84092 942-5431 
Mt. Lie'.: 
47-iV North /" 
At :;! J a n e 
A 1 ':.a Can v 
INVOICE DATE INVOICE NUMBER 
QUANTITY 
^^Mmm 
Snow R e m o v a ] 3*vrv i r* e ' 1 * A. ." • PM i - S <-"« 
? r & ? dufp;? : r . * 
now ^ e n » v * l S e r v i c e _ ' ' > AM 
^Voval wi'tFF' f r o n t - e m 
W ) o w s . 
"i£I$?SB&y 
• CURRENT-"'. *..«> '*?' „\-1 ~ 30 DAYS * • • 3 1 * 60 DAYS | 
1 
i 
\X - ' 3 ) HM 
6 1 - 9 0 DAYS 
JL- V-J- ^J 
OVER 90 DAYS TOTAL 
DUE 
Net 10 Days. I\ 
Prompt payment would be appreciated. THANK YQU. 
fstote -o 
^""^"Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists ft 
3089 Little Cottonwood Road 
Sandy, Utah 84092 942-5431 
lit. Boll 
4747 North 71 
?hoen i x , A,: . 
A :. »: n : J •:; n e 
. Street. 
?G#0t>.! iOl' 
.•; y o n 
*: i 
INVOICE DATE INVOICE NUMBER 
DESCRIPTION 
Snow Remo\«»l > r v i c e \\> AM - < ' rV ->>.< -'~ 
Snow Reniov J->x v ic»2 ' 1< ' AM 
*Mz***$&tifS*i fS^JSEETte) AlT"-."fe> Pk* 2-5-85 j 
Snow Remoiva I S e r v i c e '" > AM * s tf .'-•*• c< ~ y 
Snow R e m o v i l S e r v i c e • -T> AM - i °tf * -CJ •//* V 
E ? h ^ S : n t ^ n d ¥ l ^ d « r ; *'. 2" duap Units 
^ CURRENTfr^frf^ 
w i t h p l o w s . L* Hr*-.. J - i l * h r u , • ? A v 
g S S S v ^ i l - w i t h r r c Y i t - e n d f o d d e r & 2 dump uni t . f i 
-jfrvOfc i;*-30 DAYS - i - 3 1 - 6 0 PAYS 81 -90 DAYS OVER 90 DAYS 
stu. '* 
TOTAL 
/DUEv 
Net 10 Days. 
Prompt payment would be appreciated. THANK YOU. 
- 2 
itJBM£k 
Estate •o 
*~^ "Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists" 
vsmum 3089 Little Cottonw 
Sandy, Utah 84092 942-5431 
f— 
M t . . B e l ! 
4 7 ^ 7 N o r t h 'i 't!
 ; S t t e#et 
P h o e n i x , i\Z ,15()I * 
At * i n: I'ai ie P04 0G1 10;, 
i, . t a ::tt ft y c n 
#
 : ! • ; : 
INVOICE OATE INVOICE NUMBER; 
UANTITY DESCRIPTION 
} 
i-^^^§5 
tSSftSS 
;W??i¥£ 
v : .i p 1 ows . 
l l g ^ b w i ^ e t m o v a 1 
S n o ^ r e m o v a l 
*>, • * ", ... i . O W 3 , 
U ,""Sjno.W";.,j::R«'iiio v a 1 
4^BSScftft?rsR#moval 
CURRENT-••^•^•^ i r • 1 - 3 0 DAYS 
v l\ v a I ?iriOiM'i* ' i '~* • ".'. ^ i " " • ' • * 
S e r v i c e ( .1 ) • l! 1 ' ( X > 
•  w I, t h £ x o n t e i i d 1, o a d e r 
S e r v i c e C2> 
S e r v i c e " 1 : ! !. * « ., -
r ; ' 3 e r v i c i '"' ..(2) "AM '• '' 
S e r v i c e 
' S e r v i c e ( 2 > A M 
31 * 60 DAYS 
p jv? 
a n d 
PM 
i 'M 
o <* 
61 - 90 0AYS | 
. - ; • • • . « • ^ 
J Nk. 
T . i P ' , • - ! r. 
.. - i i . - a - 3 > 
2 - 2 3 - •?'.? ^ 
:,-6-*?. v 
OVER 9 0 DAY?"- I TOTAL. 
DUE 
Net 10 Days. 
Prompt payment would be appreciated. THANK YQU. 
70 . 0' 
' . 00 
Estate o 
^ "Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists" 
Kuiui* 3089 Little Cottonwood Road 
Sandy, Utah 84092 942-5431 
— 
V 
K t . B ~ l l 
4 7 4 7 N o r t h 7 t h S v r e e t 
P h o e n i x , AZ . 65014 
A t i n : J a n e P0#06110i.< 
Ai t. :\ Cony on 
e 
# 2 12 
*><J> 
^ 
J 
K 
INVOICiDATE 
• » 4 / . ; ." •*<* , 
IN VOICE NUMBER 
1 ^ 7 (.->«, 
J 
DESCRIPTION AMOUNT 
J 
-mm, 
i 
5§§3|ipf 
Sn-:»u> R e m o v a l I T - e r v i c ^ <> l > 
awiBamoval; iServ ice
 ; (3 > AM - ( 3 ) 
Snow R s m o y a i S e r v i c e iS? AM - < 1 '• 
I^^Sw:lRoMoval S e r v i c e . (3) AM - (2) 
Snow S e n o v ^ i f ' ^ rv i ' ve < / : AN 
- w i t h , f r o n t - e n d loader 
mm 
^ CURRENT * ^ * K i 
DW R e m o v a l ^ ^ r v u r e »3 * AH • < 3> 
aM&BK^£r* ,5£E* o r AM - <2> 
- * * * M - 3 0 D A Y S * I ' 3 1 - 6 0 DAYS 
PM 
PM 
and 
PM 
PM 
PM 
< 6 1 - 9 0 0 AYS 
3 - 3 - 8 5 . 
1 • - : • < - ) ( . 
2 dump u n i t : i 
3 - 1 2 - 8 5 -
OVER 90 0AYS 1 
• • ' * ' - . 
:'..,S.1Q-
4 2 5 
t.99. 
;oo 
% • » t . ,• . 
\T. 425" »00L 
TOTAL 
DUE 
Net 10 Days. 
Prompt payment would be appreciated. THANK YOU. 
- 4 
rstai 
Snow Removal Specialists" 
3089 Little Cottonwood Road 
Sandy, Utah 84092 942-5431 
Mt . b * ! ' 
4 7 4 7 N o i ' . i i i n - I.IHMJI 
P h o e n i x , A?.. «": <. 1-1 
INVOICE DATE, INVOICE NUMBER 
*!*<:' 
DESCRIPTION 
Snow removal +>^ th front end i.-~ i 
r:o<v> Removal Service ('1; AM 
""CD AM 
Snow Removal 5ervlc?e f2> AW 
t 1 > .« K 
CI) AM 
Removal Service I • * 
*Sne»W T&woval Service -(3) AM - i*» p« 
*^nc^|[«moyaX Serves*,' 
Snow Removal Service 
owoiiem,oy^l Service 
:.THOW 
i>: 
PM 
• 1 3 * 
• 2 0 -
a 
35 V 
'SB y 
<-?/; 
-8b 
-81. 
- 8 5 
1 - 30 DAYS 31 -60 DAYS 61 -90 DAYS OVER 90 DAYS f^TOTAL 
DUE 
Net 1 0 Days. 
Prompt payment would be appreciated. THANK YOU. :, 
AMOUNT 
1 4 8 5 - 0 0 
255.DO 
25.5. CO 
42'S. 0' 
fstate 
j 
o 
^ " • ^ "Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists" 
uxuMim 3089 Little Cottonwood Road 
Sandy, Utah 84092 942-5431 
f — 
V 
Mt. B e l l " 
^747 N o r t h 7 t h S t r e e t 
P h o e n i x . AZ, 35014 
Att-n: J a n e PQ#061 :.o.i. 
Al t a Cany or. 
V 
>•* 
# *.*' I 7 
INVOICE DATE , INVOICE NUMBER 
"-*"'*'- ^ 
DESCRIPTION: 
J inow R e m o v e ! S e r v i c e • 2 * J \ I * "-•- '• *-•*"> 
S £ S & V £ l w i ^ ' ^ r o n t * e n d loader- & 2 dumps u n i t a 
•*i M i ' 5* J* i 
mmKmMsa&wzm&rz. ,s 
p#^iP-iii%^^^i^^ii^Kii 
^ ^ @ P swwBWNWPSHPS '^^ r 
rfii CUBREMTT? *-,«**" U - t ta tHSODAYS* ' . - - .£ 31 • 60 DAYS
 r 
,# ,v -*._ ^ o ^-. . 
* ' 8 1 - 9 0 DAYS 
a*. 
OVER 90 DAYS ] 
_. Net 10 Days. 
Prompt payment would be appreciated. THANK YOU. 
AMOUNT* 
TOTAL 
DUE 
,T«I 
, r ^ 
* * , 
il ii i"I'll1;ij infi* i'lffjii11 i ii i <in"*'i, bim mi nwf(r->|i'if"j Aii i BEi X, 
I""U' ESTATE LAJNDSCAPE (EXHIBIT 6) 
k 
4747 1 1 7t l i S t r e e t , S u i t e 212 
P h o e n i x , An Lzona 8501,4 
In me 1 4 , 1985 
E s t a t e Landscape and Snow Remova 1 
3089 L i t t l e Cottonwood Road 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
UK " IIIW Ihnnnv 1 I m / n l i i " , Ii \\\ i II i I n -1)4 /01/85 I n v o i c e Da te 
Hear M i . 
r h e i: e c e n t i n v o i c e s s u b ra i 11 e d t o o t i r o £" £ J c e w I I: h r e g a r d t o c o n t r a c t e d 
Snow Removal Services at Alta Main, Aita, Utah during the period, 
12/28/84 - 04/01/85 have been reviewed along with the daily weather 
r e c o r d s s u p p 1 i ed b y * * A1 1 a P e r i i v I a n I ,o d g e" *. B a s ed < :i i; i a i: e v i e w o f y o t 11: 
invoice dates and comparing them with the reports provided by the Aita 
Peruvian Lodge regarding snow accumulation, we dispute the following 
dates and amounts aa not meeting the contracted for Rates and Charges 
and the definition tut Ii m Ltlating snow p] owing. (Snow accumu 1 a til on less 
then 4 inches). 
12/28/84 th- 11/hi 
01/08/85 
01/2L/85 
01/26/85 
02/01/85 
02/04/85 
02/05/85 
02/06/85 
02/07/85 
02/08/85 
02/11/85 c 
02/13/85 
02/15/85 
02/18/85 
02/20/85 
02/22/85 
02/23/85 
02/25/85 
02/26/85 
03/02/85 
03/06/85 
03/07/85 
03/10/85 
03/14/85 
03/16/85 
03/18/85 
03/20/85 
03/25/85 
1 Inch - 3 Inches 
3 Inches 
Trace 
No Snow 
No Snow 
3 Inches 
No Snow 
3 Inches 
3 Inches 
1 Inch 
I Inch 
3 Inches 
No Snow 
No Snow 
3 Indies 
Trace 
3 Inches 
I Inch 
3 Inches 
Trace 
No Snow 
2 Inches 
I Inch 
No Snow 
No Snow 
Trace 
No Snow 
No Snow 
$3960.00 
255.00 
255.00 
1650.00 
170.00 
510.00 
425.00 
425.00 
510.00 
340.00 
3960.00 
3052.50 
170.00 
255.00 
2722.50 
170.00 
170.00 
17 0.00 
17 0.00 
255.00 
425.00 
170.00 
170.00 
170.00 
170.00 
255.00 
255.00 
255.00 
$21549.50 
Based on the above identified billing descrepencles we have enclosed a 
check for $8613.00 which is payment in full for satisfaction of contracted 
services. If you are not willing to accept that sumt $8613.00 In full 
satisfaction of the sums due, DO NOT negotiate the check, for upon your 
negotiation of that check, we will treat the matter as fully paid. 
If there are any questions related to the above, feel free to contact me 
on (1-602) 235-3993. 
Sincerely, 
Emerson Smith 
Assistant Manager 
Real Estate Operations/CP 
cc: K.L. Uardcastle 
Stacy Jones 
Dee Myren 
I! 
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